Can South America form an optimal monetary area? A structural vector autoregression analysis by Padilla, León & Rodriguez García-Brazales, Ángel
ORIG INAL PAPER
Can South America form an optimal monetary area? A
structural vector autoregression analysis
León Padilla1 & Ángel Rodriguez García-Brazales2
Accepted: 28 October 2020 /Published online: 14 November 2020
Abstract
This research analyzes the feasibility of adopting a common currency in South America
using the Optimal Monetary Areas theory. Taking into account that the relative
dominance of regional shocks in local output is considered a key indicator to adopt a
regional currency, we use a structural vector autoregression (SVAR) model to deter-
mine what type of shock —among global, regional or country specific— prevails in
South American economies. The results of variance decomposition demonstrate that
the output trajectory of South American countries is mainly explained by country-
specific shocks; therefore, South America as a whole is not considered not an optimal
monetary area. However, we identified a group of countries—named Sud-5 (comprised
of Chile, Peru, Ecuador, Brazil and Argentina)— for which the costs of a hypothetical
monetary union would be relatively lower.
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1 Introduction
Recent changes in the International Monetary System (IMS)1 have led several econo-
mies to adopt regional currencies, as is the case for the euro area and the recent
Monetary Area in the West African (ECOWAS) project. This scenario may have an
impact on the debate about regional currencies in other economic blocs. In the case of
South America (SA), the debate started with the work of Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993), who found little support for the idea of a common currency area. Further
contributions corroborate this result, with the last relevant work being that of Larrain
and Tavares (2003) and the recent paper of Hafner and Kampe (2018). However, after
more than twenty-five years of an unprecedented process of globalization, the case for a
monetary union in SA should be revisited.
One of the main obstacles to economic integration is the reluctance of the majority
of countries to forgo their sovereignty in order to achieve more regional cohesion
(Dutta et al. 2020). In a global context, most researchers agree that Latin American
(LA) economies maintain a low level of integration. Using a set of indicators of
economic integration —suggested by the optimum currency area theory (OCA)—,
Dorrucci et al. (2004) showed that LA was less economically integrated not only than
the European Union (EU) after the adoption of the euro, but in some cases even less
than the EU at the beginning of its regional integration process in the 1960s. East Asia,
even with their relative lack of formal regional trade treaties, is more integrated among
itself than the countries within LA (Aminian et al. 2009). Reyes et al. (2010) explained
that the lower degree of integration of LA could be related to the lack of economic
development of the region. Márquez-Ramos et al. (2017) proved that institutional and
political factors influence economic integration in LA. These researchers showed that
the terrorist attack on September 11th, 2001 and the region’s policy affinity with the
Revolución Bolivariana affected the economic integration process in LA. Despite this
relatively low level of integration however, Basnet and Sharma (2013) determine that
the economic fluctuations in the seven largest economies in LA —Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru and Venezuela— follow a similar pattern in terms of
duration, intensity, response, and timing both in the long run and in the short run.
Therefore, their findings suggest that these economies in LA could benefit strongly
from regional cohesion and can lead the path of economic integration in the region.
In the context of LA, most relevant literature has focused on assessing the potential
gains to the creation of an optimal monetary area across all LA countries or within
economic blocks that maintain regional trade agreements such as MERCOSUR mem-
ber countries or the Andean Community (CAN) (Eichengreen 1998; Hochreiter and
Siklos 2002; Bresser-Pereira and Holland 2009; Numa 2011; Basnet and Pradhan 2017;
Hafner and Kampe 2018). While Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) found no evidence
to support the benefits to the adoption of a common currency in LA, their model has
been criticized because it cannot distinguish whether the shocks are regional, global, or
simply correlated local shocks (Chow and Kim 2003). Nevertheless, according to
1 The establishment of the Eurozone in 1999 and the subsequent entry into circulation of the euro in 2002 led
to changes in various aspects of the IMS, especially in the composition of international reserves. Subsequently,
the 2008 economic crisis revealed various weaknesses of the IMS, and almost all of its features functioned
incorrectly.
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Chow and Kim (2003) the prevalence of regional shocks may justify common mone-
tary policy within the region independently of their nature. In other words, the relative
importance of regional shocks in the trajectory of the local output is considered the key
indicator of the suitability of an economy to adopt a regional currency (Zhao and Kim
2009).
Consequently, in this paper we use a regional model to identify what kind of
structural shock —country-specific, regional or global shocks— prevails in SA econ-
omies. Once identified, it is possible to establish candidates who would face lower costs
to integrate a currency area in SA. These results are compared with a similar analysis of
eleven members of the euro area states, taking into account that eurozone is a
benchmark with which to compare these kinds of monetary agreements. Additionally,
contrary to previous studies that include all LA countries, our research only includes
SA countries. This is because a monetary union is much more likely in this group of
countries due to their geographical proximity, similar production patterns, existing
trade agreements, historical aspects and a greater degree of political integration. The
structure of the paper is as follows. In the second section, the OCA literature and the
research related to LA are revised. The third section details the methodology and the
model used. The fourth section outlines the most important findings. The fifth section
assesses the costs and benefits of adopting a single currency in SA. Finally, the main
conclusions of the study are presented.
2 Literature survey
The workhorse model of the monetary unions is still that of the optimum currency areas
(OCA), developed in the seminal work by Mundell (1961), McKinnon (1963) and
Kenen (1969). The theory established that the adjustment mechanisms that replace the
monetary policy are factor mobility and labor market flexibility. Furthermore, the OCA
theory also identified benefits and cost in order to determine the adequacy of adopting a
single currency. Among the benefits, they found an increase in intra-regional trade
caused by the suppression of exchange rate risk and the reduction of transaction costs;
improved conditions for investment, production, and consumption; the transparency of
prices; and enhanced credibility due to the adoption of an international currency and
price stability. Among the costs, they identified the loss of autonomy in monetary
policy, the loss of the possibility of financing fiscal deficits through monetary issuance,
and the reduction of sovereignty by giving up the national currency (Obstfeld and
Rogoff 1996; Visser 2004).
However, Alesina et al. (2002) argued that the higher the correlation of shocks
among a new potential member of a monetary area and the member countries is, the
lower the cost of losing monetary policy independence. As Frankel and Rose (1997)
argue, “Countries with idiosyncratic business cycles give up a potentially important
stabilizing tool if they join a currency union. Another criterion for EMU entry is
therefore the cross-country correlation of business cycles. Countries with “symmetric”
cycles are more likely to be members of an OCA.” Consequently, if the business cycles
of the members of a monetary area are synchronized, the cost of losing the monetary
policy to deal with imbalances should be lower. Subsequently, Frankel (1999) deter-
mined that even when the candidate countries to join a monetary area face higher costs
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than benefits (therefore, they do not belong to an optimal monetary area), once
integrated into a monetary area, the increase in both trade integration and output
correlation would lead to the benefits being higher than the costs. This means that
countries could meet the ex post optimality criterion, even though they did not do so ex
ante.
The literature on the suitability of LA, particularly SA, to form a monetary area is
limited compared to that carried out on other economic blocs. Most research has
focused on certain groups of countries that maintain trade agreements, such as
MERCOSUR or the Andean Community. Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993), through
the application of vector autoregression (VAR) in SA, found low correlations in supply
shocks, while the correlations of the demand shocks were seven times lower than in
Europe and three times lower than in Asia. In later work, Eichengreen (1998) evaluated
whether a monetary union could decrease the volatility of the exchange rates of the
member countries of MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay and Uruguay). Re-
search has shown that a regional currency is not an effective option for reducing
exchange rate volatility. Similarly, they also argued that a deeper integration requires
the harmonization of national regulations at several levels (such as the EU). Licandro
(2000) examined the degree of similarity of the supply shocks that affect the countries
that make up MERCOSUR, the NAFTA and the EU. His results demonstrate that the
correlations of the supply shocks of the countries of MERCOSUR have a low level of
correlation compared to those of other blocs such as the EU and NAFTA. In a study
conducted on countries of South and Central America, Larrain and Tavares (2003)
evaluated some criteria for the creation of a monetary union while making a distinction
between two types —dollarization and a regional currency— and concluded that
dollarization may be an option for the countries of Central America. However, they
believe that neither the dollarization nor a regional currency would be a good option for
SA.
In addition to the literature related to the synchronization of supply and demand
shocks, there some other works building upon the euro area experience. Hochreiter and
Siklos (2002) took the criteria set out in the Maastricht Treaty as a reference for
determining the level of economic convergence. His research findings showed that in
the LA region, there was a low level of convergence between Brazil (the main
economic referent) and the rest of the countries. Only positive convergence results
were obtained with Paraguay and to a lesser extent with Chile. The authors concluded
that the creation of a common currency would be costly given the low level of
synchronization in economic cycles. Hochreiter et al. (2002) studied the changes in
LA’s monetary systems at the beginning of the twenty-first century. They argued that
the LA region has a high level of heterogeneity, where countries differ in size, structure
and economic policies. With respect to trade, the authors noted that although trade has
significantly increased in most of the countries of the region, brought about by the
regional common market agreements (such as MERCOSUR or the Andean Pact), trade
integration is still deficient. In the same vein, Numa (2011) determined that both
MERCOSUR and CAN require a higher level of economic and political integration
to form an optimal monetary area.
Kopits (2002) carried out a comparative analysis, using the criteria set out in the
Maastricht Treaty, between the countries of Central Europe (which at the time were in
the process of joining the euro area) and of LA (especially those of SA). According to
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the above author, the then candidates from Central Europe appeared to be better placed
to join a monetary union (euro area) than the LA countries, given the latter’s less
homogeneous economic structure, limited trade and low labor mobility within the LA
region. Edwards (2006) analyzed empirical evidence on the economic performance of
countries that form monetary unions—those that do not have their own currency— and
interpreted the results with respect to LA. The analysis focused primarily on (1) sudden
stops in capital flows and (2) the current account reversals. The results suggest that
belonging to a monetary union has not reduced the likelihood of sudden stops in capital
flow or sudden changes in the current account. In summary, the literature regarding LA
countries agrees that they are not good candidates for the constitution of a monetary
area.
In a more recent study, Bresser-Pereira and Holland (2009) discovered that a
regional currency could improve the integration process in LA by reducing the nominal
exchange rate volatility, particularly for MERCOSUR. These findings coincide with
the results published by Basnet and Pradhan (2017). These authors demonstrated that
MERCOSUR countries share common trends in their main macroeconomic indicators.
Finally, Hafner and Kampe (2018) demonstrated that LA and its RTAs are far from
being considered an optimal monetary area because these countries have marked
heterogeneities in terms of income, growth and economic structure. However, the most
important conclusion of his research is that the countries belonging to the CAN present
better homogeneity (in terms of the openness and mobility of factors) compared to the
countries belonging to MERCOSUR.
3 Methodology
As mentioned above, one of the most relevant aspects for the constitution of a common
currency is the degree of synchronization of business cycles among the economies. The
first study that analyzed the synchronization of business cycles was presented by
Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1993) . These authors used an autoregressive vector model
to estimate both the supply and demand shocks for the various economic blocs. The
researchers integrated a restriction in which the supply shocks had permanent effects on
the output level, while demand shocks only had temporary effects on the output level.
According to Bayoumi and Eichengreen, the presence of highly correlated or symmet-
rical supply shocks within a region is an indicator that a group of countries are good
candidates for the constitution of a monetary union. However, an important criticism
made about the approach proposed by Bayoumi and Eichengreen is that such a
methodology does not allow for the distinction among different types of shocks
according to their geographical origin; in other words, among country-specific,
regional and global shocks.
Chow and Kim (2003) established that the prevalence of each type of shock
determines the monetary system that the country should adopt (single currency,
monetary union, or global agreement). In other words, if country-specific shocks
prevail in an economy, the country should opt for a national currency. If regional
shocks predominate in a set of economies and there is also a correlation among regional
shocks, a common monetary policy or a regional exchange rate arrangement can be
justified. If global shocks prevail in one region and if they similarly affect all economies
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within and outside the region, a global monetary system —or pegging to a global
currency (for example, the U.S. dollar or euro)— is justified. Consequently, the strategy
in this paper is to identify what kind of structural shock prevails in the countries of SA
—country-specific, regional or global shocks. Once identified, it will be possible to
establish candidates who could constitute a currency area.
3.1 Model
To identify the underlying global, regional and country-specific structural shocks, we
follow a similar strategy to that of Chow and Kim (2003), Zhao and Kim (2009) and
Regmi et al. (2015), and it is also based on the methodology proposed by Blanchard
and Quah (1988) and King et al. (1987). In this strategy, the domestic output, yd, faces
three types of shocks: global, regional and country-specific (ug, ur and ud):
Δydt ¼ β0 þ β1 Lð Þugt þ β2 Lð Þurt þ β3 Lð Þudt ; ð1Þ
where βi(L) = βi0 + βi1L + βi2L2 +… is a polynomial function of the lag operator (L).
Considering Eq. (1), the model is determined by three variables: the global (yg),
regional (yr) and domestic (yd) output. The relation of the three structural shocks to
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where Aij Lð Þ ¼ a0ij þ a1ijLþ a2ijL2 þ…, and the matrix representation isΔyt = A(L)ut. It
is assumed that the structural shocks of each type (global, regional and country-
specific) are not correlated and that the variance is unitary—that is, Var(ut) = I.
Considering that the different types of shocks are not observed, Chow and Kim
(2003) propose the following restrictions to identify the innovations: (i) country-
specific shocks have no impact on the regional or global output in the long term, and
(ii) regional shocks do not have an impact on the global output in the long term.2 Those
restrictions are the standard ones in characterizing small open economies. Specifically,
global shocks (GS) affect all economies worldwide, including at the regional and
domestic levels. An example of such a global shock would be the 2008 global financial
crisis. Regional shocks (RS) affect within regional and local levels. However, such
shocks do not expand to other regions. An example of regional shock is the commodity
price boom observed in SA between 2004 and 2014.3 Country-specific shocks (CS)
only affect one particular country, and the effects of this event do not spread to other
economies. Natural disasters or economic crises, such as the 2001 Argentinian eco-
nomic crisis, are considered country-specific shocks. In matrix terms, the restrictions
imply that certain matrix coefficients A(L), which are represented in Eq. (2), are equal
2 According to the authors, long-term restrictions are often subject to less criticism than short-term restrictions.
3 According to the Federal Reserve economic data, the Global Price Index of All Commodities grew an
average of 13% per year.
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to zero. That is, A12 (1) = A13 (1) = A23 (1) = 0. In other words, these estimates are
omitted. Consequently, through global, regional and domestic output, it is possible to
identify global, regional, and country-specific shocks for a given country.4
3.2 Data
Our analysis included nine countries from SA (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia,
Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela) and eleven countries from the euro
area (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the
Netherlands, Portugal and Spain), known as EMU-12.5 The inclusion of European
economies is explained by the possibility of comparing the results obtained for SA with
those of an established monetary union. The panels were divided into two periods to
compare different patterns over time. The first time period corresponds to annual data
between 1970 and 2001. The second time period includes quarterly data, from the first
quarter of 2001 to the fourth quarter of 2015 (except for Argentina, which started in the
first quarter of 2004).6 Following the economic crises of the 1980s and 1990s, SA
countries have shown greater macroeconomic stability since the beginning of the
twenty-first century, with the exception of Venezuela and Argentina. In this sense,
even when SA has not carried out a monetary integration process —and therefore it is
not possible to test the ex post endogeneity approach stressed by Frankel and Rose
(1997, 2001) —, the purpose of splitting the database into two periods is to verify if
there were changes in the influence of regional shocks over time. For SA, the annual
data were obtained from the IMF Outlook report and the quarterly reports from official
sources in each country; for European countries, the source was the European Com-
mission database.
The variable used for the SVAR model and for the identification of the different
shocks is the real output of each country, in addition to the proxy variables of the
regional and global real outputs. For the purpose of representing regional output,
previous studies used countries with significant economic and political weights within
certain regions (Chow and Kim 2003; Zhao and Kim 2009; Regmi et al. 2015). This
study used the output of Chile to represent the regional output —or a “center of
gravity”— from SA. This choice is justified by the fact that Chile has the best
macroeconomic performance in the region (low levels of inflation, fiscal deficit, debt,
and fluctuation in its nominal exchange rate). However, in the robustness check section,
we use different combinations. Particularly, estimates were also calculated considering
Brazil as another regional output option due to its significant representation in the total
output of SA (approximately 50% of the regional output). In regard to European
4 The adoption of restrictions entails the application of structural autoregressive (SVAR) models since this
methodology allows for the integration of established assumptions in the economic theory, unlike traditional
VAR models.
5 This group of countries are known in such way because they were the first twelve members of the euro area;
they also represent the most relevant countries in economic terms.
6 For the quarterly data of SA, it was necessary to conduct a seasonal adjustment by the Census X-13 method,
excluding Ecuador. Moreover, for the quarterly series, a qualitative variable was included as an exogenous
variable, from the second quarter of 2008 until the second quarter of 2009. This variable was included with the
purpose of controlling for the effects of the 2008 economic crisis and avoiding erroneous estimates.
Can South America form an optimal monetary area? A structural... 315
countries, the output of Germany was used. The real output of the United States (US)
was used as the proxy variable of the global output for both blocs.
The first difference of the logarithm of the country-specific, regional and global
output is included for each specification, while for an independent variable, it is the first
lag of each variable, except in cases in which the adoption of another strategy is
indicated.7 The augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test found that the variables do not
have a unit root. Furthermore, the Johansen test revealed the absence of cointegration
among the variables. All models complied with the stability conditions; in other words,
their own values were within the unit circle and did not show autocorrelation in the
remainder.
4 Model results
The results of the impulse-response function show that between 1970 and 2001, the
EMU-12 countries have less sensitivity to regional shocks compared to the SA region,
as shown the impulse response functions in Fig. 1. The most significant case is that of
Finland, which has a much more asymmetric pattern than do the rest of the European
countries. These preliminary results do not justify the creation of a monetary area in SA
Subsequently, the variance decomposition was estimated for the prediction error made
for a time horizon of two and ten years. This process allows us to establish the
percentage of volatility that a variable experiences when faced with disturbances of
other variables.8 The variance decomposition for the prediction error indicates the
degree of the prediction error of the real output of each country produced by each type
of shock: global, regional and country-specific. For the annual data between 1970 and
2001, predictions were made for the short (two years) and medium (ten years) term. In
the euro area, regional shocks account for 24.9%, on average, of real output in the short
term (2 years) and 26% in the medium term (10 years), between 1970 and 2001. The
countries with the least impact on their output due to regional shocks were Finland,
Ireland and Italy (in the short term), while Greece and Austria have the greatest
7 The optimal number of lags was determined by the Akaike information criterion (AIC) and the Schwarz
information criterion (SIC).
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Fig. 1 Regional Shocks in Europe (left) and South America (right), 1970–2000
316 L. Padilla, Á. R. García-Brazales
dominance. Nevertheless, despite showing a high incidence of regional shocks, it has
also been proven that the real output variation in euro area countries mainly depends on
country-specific shocks. In regard to the SA group, the regional shocks characterized
by Chile’s real output explain on average 8.9% in the short term and 10% in the
medium term.9 The variance of the real GDP of each country is largely explained by
country-specific shocks in both the short and medium term, at 81.6% and 80.5%,
respectively. These data suggest that between 1970 and 2000, the best option for SA
countries was to maintain their domestic currencies. Two striking data are that for both
Brazil and Ecuador, the shocks induced by the US explain approximately 20% (in the
short and medium term) of the variance of their outputs (Tables 1 and 2).
9 Due to problems of the unitary root, even after applying the first difference, it was necessary to apply the
second difference for the data from Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay.
Table 1 Variance decomposition of domestic output, 1970–2001
















Austria 0.029 0.391 0.580 0.033 0.389 0.578
Belgium 0.090 0.248 0.662 0.091 0.250 0.659
Finland 0.106 0.088 0.806 0.109 0.238 0.653
France 0.117 0.329 0.553 0.140 0.329 0.531
Greece 0.146 0.535 0.319 0.145 0.537 0.318
Ireland 0.152 0.067 0.781 0.170 0.095 0.734
Italy 0.153 0.072 0.775 0.160 0.070 0.771
Luxembourg 0.152 0.171 0.677 0.173 0.176 0.652
Netherlands 0.165 0.187 0.648 0.179 0.194 0.627
Portugal 0.070 0.343 0.586 0.090 0.337 0.573
Spain 0.100 0.315 0.585 0.156 0.251 0.593
Average 0.116 0.250 0.634 0.131 0.261 0.608
South America-10 (Core Chile)
Argentina 0.023 0.149 0.828 0.025 0.149 0.826
Bolivia 0.120 0.009 0.872 0.121 0.010 0.869
Brazil 0.208 0.065 0.727 0.228 0.131 0.641
Colombia 0.012 0.025 0.963 0.017 0.025 0.958
Ecuador 0.200 0.173 0.627 0.194 0.192 0.614
Paraguay 0.138 0.169 0.693 0.136 0.178 0.686
Peru 0.074 0.052 0.879 0.086 0.054 0.901
Uruguay 0.005 0.128 0.866 0.005 0.129 0.865
Venezuela 0.079 0.032 0.889 0.079 0.035 0.887
Average 0.095 0.089 0.816 0.099 0.100 0.805
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With the aim of analyzing dynamic changes from 2001 and considering several
events in SA (changes in monetary systems and the reduction of internal imbalances)
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Fig. 2 Regional Shocks in Europe (left) and South America (right), 2001–2015
Table 2 Variance decomposition of domestic output, 2001–2015
















Austria 0.055 0.343 0.602 0.061 0.341 0.598
Belgium 0.288 0.363 0.350 0.283 0.357 0.360
Finland 0.173 0.117 0.710 0.173 0.117 0.710
France 0.248 0.354 0.397 0.251 0.353 0.396
Greece 0.162 0.062 0.776 0.205 0.136 0.659
Ireland 0.036 0.005 0.960 0.036 0.005 0.960
Italy 0.155 0.550 0.295 0.147 0.513 0.340
Luxembourg 0.121 0.245 0.634 0.122 0.245 0.633
Netherlands 0.119 0.296 0.585 0.136 0.288 0.576
Portugal 0.056 0.192 0.752 0.057 0.191 0.752
Spain 0.006 0.161 0.833 0.019 0.160 0.821
Average 0.129 0.244 0.627 0.135 0.246 0.619
South America −10 (Core Chile)
Argentina 0.037 0.113 0.848 0.037 0.113 0.848
Bolivia 0.090 0.025 0.886 0.089 0.026 0.885
Brazil 0.103 0.419 0.479 0.107 0.418 0.475
Colombia 0.049 0.016 0.935 0.049 0.018 0.933
Ecuador 0.080 0.162 0.758 0.094 0.174 0.732
Paraguay 0.038 0.033 0.929 0.038 0.033 0.929
Peru 0.013 0.153 0.833 0.016 0.157 0.827
Uruguay 0.127 0.016 0.857 0.130 0.017 0.854
Venezuela 0.122 0.018 0.860 0.122 0.020 0.858
Average 0.073 0.106 0.821 0.076 0.108 0.816
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was replicated using quarterly data between 2001 and 2015.10 For this dataset, predic-
tions were made for two quarters (short term) and twenty-four quarters (medium term).
Figure 2 shows that the degree of symmetry of regional shocks in the euro area declined
considerably, even when controlling for the estimate with the dummy variable (crisis).
The countries showing the greatest asymmetry in the regional shock trend are Luxem-
bourg, Greece and Ireland. In contrast, SA had a greater symmetry in regional shocks
compared to the previous period (1970–2001), although it could be considered
deficient.
According to variance decomposition, the regional shocks in the European countries
remain at similar levels to those found in the annual data, averaging 24% in the short
and medium term. These results are striking; according to Frankel and Rose (1997,
2001), after forming a currency zone, the countries should increase their synchroniza-
tion of business cycles. This concept is known as the ex post optimality. However, the
findings show that European economies face similar levels of regional shocks, even
after the entry of the euro. Ireland, which had a low level of regional shocks in the
previous panel, has reduced the effect of common disturbances on the trajectory of its
output. Greece has also reduced the effect of common shocks.
In contrast, Italy has significantly increased its common or regional shocks. In the
case of SA, the values show that, on average, the real GDP deviations are largely
explained by domestic shocks, and the regional shock levels are maintained. In general,
the dominance of regional shocks in the SA economies has slightly increased compared
to the period 1970–2001. However, this improvement may be considered deficient to
pursue a monetary integration process throughout the region. The most relevant results
are those of Ecuador (16.2%) and Peru (15.2%), which show a greater presence of
regional shocks (represented by Chile) compared with the rest of the countries. Finally,
the level of explanation of regional shocks in Brazil reaches 41.9% in both the short and
medium term.
4.1 Robustness checks
Considering that the denomination of the regional output and the global output is
arbitrary (especially in the case of the representation of the regional output by Chile,
which is a relatively small economy in SA), in this section we present alternative
models with different representations of both variables with the purpose of ensuring
robustness in our results and we compare it with the benchmark model (BM). Table 3
reports the main results.
In the first alternative model, M1, the regional output is represented by the output of
Brazil and the global output is US. We use this configuration because of the economic
weight (about half of the output in SA) and international relevance. In M2 the regional
output is represented by the sum of the outputs of Chile, Peru and Ecuador—countries
with higher level of explanation of regional shocks in the BM and greater macroeco-
nomic stability— and the global output by the sum of the outputs of the US and the EU.
10 For this group of variables, it was necessary to make the following specifications. For the Greece model, it
was necessary to include three lags since there were autocorrelation problems in the errors for the models with
one and two lags. For the Spanish variable, it was necessary to make the specifications with the second
difference, in addition to the logarithm, since with the first difference, there were unit root problems.
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The M3 model uses the same M2 specification for the global output, while the regional
output is represented by the sum of Brazil, Colombia and Chile —the main economies
of the region. In M4 and M5 for the global output we use the sum of the outputs of the
US, the EU and Japan. In M4, the regional output is the sum of Brazil, Chile, Peru and
Ecuador. In M5 the regional output is the sum of all SA countries (with the exception of
Argentina due to data availability issues).
Although changes in the specifications of the model produce slightly different
outcomes —especially when Brazil is integrated to represent the regional output—
they show consistency with those obtained in the BM. Specifically, regional shocks
maintain a greater relevance in Brazil, Chile, Peru and Ecuador. Note that in the M3,
Table 3 Variance decomposition in the Alternative Models
BM M1 M2 M3 M4 M5
(2) (24) (2) (24) (2) (24) (2) (24) (2) (24) (2) (24)
Argentina GS 0.037 0.037 0.042 0.044 0.036 0.037 0.057 0.083 0.041 0.054 0.082 0.090
RS 0.113 0.011 0.192 0.198 0.128 0.130 0.201 0.215 0.192 0.212 0.172 0.174
DS 0.848 0.848 0.764 0.757 0.835 0.833 0.742 0.702 0.767 0.734 0.747 0.736
Bolivia GS 0.090 0.089 0.068 0.068 0.055 0.056 0.088 0.091 0.068 0.069 0.112 0.114
RS 0.025 0.026 0.027 0.028 0.054 0.057 0.076 0.078 0.070 0.075 0.053 0.054
DS 0.886 0.885 0.905 0.903 0.891 0.888 0.836 0.830 0.862 0.856 0.835 0.833
Brazil GS 0.103 0.107 – – 0.093 0.097 0.156 0.187 0.141 0.156 0.143 0.159
RS 0.419 0.418 – – 0.514 0.511 0.837 0.806 0.818 0.802 0.796 0.781
DS 0.479 0.475 – – 0.393 0.393 0.007 0.007 0.041 0.042 0.061 0.060
Chile GS – – 0.116 0.120 0.104 0.105 0.089 0.100 0.177 0.178 0.182 0.187
RS – – 0.201 0.217 0.594 0.596 0.232 0.254 0.220 0.241 0.213 0.222
DS – – 0.684 0.663 0.303 0.298 0.679 0.647 0.603 0.581 0.605 0.591
Colombia GS 0.049 0.049 0.048 0.048 0.050 0.051 0.035 0.035 0.020 0.020 0.031 0.031
RS 0.016 0.018 0.055 0.055 0.044 0.044 0.064 0.066 0.044 0.044 0.096 0.096
DS 0.935 0.933 0.897 0.896 0.905 0.905 0.901 0.899 0.937 0.936 0.873 0.873
Ecuador GS 0.08 0.094 0.081 0.100 0.070 0.083 0.284 0.262 0.271 0.250 0.293 0.271
RS 0.162 0.174 0.103 0.138 0.215 0.228 0.080 0.157 0.063 0.147 0.097 0.164
DS 0.758 0.732 0.815 0.762 0.715 0.689 0.636 0.581 0.666 0.603 0.610 0.565
Paraguay GS 0.038 0.038 0.031 0.031 0.036 0.036 0.080 0.081 0.073 0.073 0.063 0.063
RS 0.033 0.033 0.086 0.086 0.157 0.157 0.070 0.073 0.066 0.067 0.059 0.061
DS 0.929 0.929 0.884 0.883 0.808 0.808 0.850 0.847 0.861 0.861 0.878 0.877
Peru GS 0.013 0.016 0.018 0.023 0.013 0.016 0.284 0.285 0.318 0.314 0.273 0.272
RS 0.153 0.157 0.148 0.158 0.467 0.470 0.165 0.179 0.154 0.170 0.129 0.139
DS 0.833 0.827 0.834 0.819 0.520 0.514 0.551 0.536 0.527 0.517 0.599 0.589
Uruguay GS 0.127 0.13 0.127 0.133 0.133 0.135 0.026 0.042 0.013 0.021 0.034 0.042
RS 0.016 0.017 0.047 0.052 0.069 0.069 0.081 0.085 0.093 0.096 0.101 0.102
DS 0.857 0.854 0.825 0.816 0.798 0.796 0.893 0.873 0.895 0.882 0.865 0.855
Venezuela GS 0.122 0.122 0.120 0.120 0.114 0.114 0.089 0.089 0.109 0.109 0.070 0.070
RS 0.018 0.02 0.083 0.083 0.027 0.029 0.079 0.079 0.072 0.072 0.113 0.113
DS 0.86 0.858 0.798 0.798 0.859 0.857 0.832 0.832 0.819 0.819 0.817 0.817
Average GS 0.073 0.076 0.072 0.069 0.070 0.073 0.119 0.126 0.123 0.124 0.128 0.130
RS 0.106 0.097 0.094 0.102 0.227 0.229 0.189 0.199 0.179 0.193 0.183 0.191
DS 0.821 0.816 0.741 0.730 0.703 0.698 0.693 0.675 0.698 0.683 0.689 0.680
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M4 and M5 models, the dominance of regional shocks in Brazil exceeds 80% (causing
the average of regional shocks for SA to increase). This is due to the strong influence of
this country on regional output. Furthermore, it is important to note that Chile’s output
also presents a high level of explanation by the regional shocks in the different
configurations. Consequently, Chile, Brazil, Peru and Ecuador would be better posi-
tioned to form a monetary area. Finally, it should be noted that in M1, M3, M4 and M5
(when Brazil integrates the regional output) demonstrates that Argentina’s output is
also influenced by the regional shocks. Thus, the costs of adopting a regional currency
would be reduced for Argentina as long as Brazil becomes a member of the integrating
group.
5 Discussion and final considerations
Following Mongelli (2002) and De Grauwe and Mongelli (2005), we use graphical
representations to illustrate the relative position of EMU-12 and SA countries with


















































Fig. 3 Costs and benefits in EMU-12 (BM model)
Source: Trade Map.
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—i.e., where the benefits are greater than the costs. Taking into account that the loss of
a national monetary policy instrument is more costly as the degree of business cycles
asymmetry increases (Frankel and Rose 1997; Alesina et al. 2002), the costs of
adopting a common currency are illustrated by variance decomposition for the predic-
tion error of the regional shocks obtained previously. The higher the degree of
explanation of the variance of the output by the regional shocks, the lower the costs
of adopting a regional currency. Takin into consideration that intra-regional trade is a
source of benefits of a monetary union (De Grauwe and Mongelli 2005; De Grauwe
2016), we use the intra-regional trade in the EMU-12 and SA (between 2001 and 2015)
to represent the benefits. Therefore, the OCA line (downward sloping) shows the
possible combinations between asymmetry (costs) and integration (benefits). Conse-
quently, points lying to the right of the OCA line represent countries for which the
benefits of a monetary union exceed its costs.
As Fig. 3 shows, the countries of the EMU-12 for which the benefits exceed the
costs are Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Belgium, Austria and Italy. For SA, we use the
















































Fig. 4 Costs and benefits in South America (BM model)
Source: Trade Map.
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Figs. 4, 5 and 6, none of SA countries falls to the right of the OCA line—i.e., the costs
outweigh the benefits. However, based on the results of the MB models (with Chile as
core) and M1 (with Brazil as core) which are illustrated in Figs. 4 and 5, it is possible to
determine that the countries with the lowest costs in a hypothetical monetary unification
are: Peru, Ecuador, Chile, Brazil and Argentina. We categorize this group of countries
as Sud-5. Although these economies would obtain less gains from adopting a regional
currency because of their poor level of intra-regional trade, Sud-5 countries share
borders that would facilitate intra-regional trade that could reduce the costs and make
integration attractive. Moreover, a common currency in Sud-5 countries would allow a
boost in intra-regional trade taking into account that monetary unions increase the trade
between their members (Rose 2000; de Nardis and Vicarelli 2003; Bun and Klaassen
2007; Berger and Nitsch 2008). An important finding is that according to the M5
model, in which regional shocks are represented by the sum of regional output, costs
increase for all countries due to, in average, the regional shocks influence is lower
—only Brazil and Chile exceed the average. These outcomes raise important questions
which are: what would be the best path SA countries could take to achieve monetary

















































Fig. 5 Costs and benefits in South America (M1 model)
Source: Trade Map.
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In relation to the first question, the most feasible path would be a partial monetary
integration in which the economies that have the best conditions to adopt a common
currency form a core and then other economies that meet the basic requirements can
gradually integrate. Let’s remember that a monetary integration in SA as a whole would
increase costs for all countries. The second question is much more difficult to answer.
Several authors agree that Germany played a decisive role in the creation of the euro
area because this country had key characteristics to promote a monetary unification
process: macroeconomic stability, institutional credibility and a solid international
standing (Hadjimichalis 2011; Eichengreen 2012; Crum 2013; De Grauwe and Ji
2015). Certainly, there are two possible economies in SA that could play a central
(or core) role: Brazil and Chile. On the one hand, Brazil is the region’s most repre-
sentative economy (approximately 50% of SA’s total GDP) and maintains a great
influence on Chile’s business cycle. However, the downside of this proposal is Brazil’s
deep macroeconomic imbalances and institutional weaknesses. Specifically, this coun-
try maintains persistent fiscal imbalances, inflationary pressures, rising unemployment
rate, weaknesses in the business environment, exchange rate volatility, the highest

















































Fig. 6 Costs and benefits in South America (M5 model)
Source: Trade Map.
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“facilitating features” at the political and social level to carry out the institutional
reforms that would strengthen the Brazilian economy (Coelho 2020). In addition, as
several authors stress (Rivarola Puntigliano and Briceño Ruiz 2017; Scholvin and
Malamud 2020), there are social, political, and structural constraints to Brazil’s regional
hegemony —such as location and physical barriers, the distribution of the population
and economic activity, infrastructure for energy and transportation, and public
policies— resulting in a disconnection of the economy from its neighbors.
On the other hand, contrary to Brazil, Chile has achieved an extended period of
macroeconomic stability and solid institutional credibility. The Chilean economy is
characterized by moderate levels of unemployment, price stability, better macro-fiscal
performance with low levels of primary fiscal deficits and the lowest general govern-
ment debt in SA (25.6% of GDP in 2018). At the institutional level, the Chilean Central
Bank demonstrates one of the highest levels of Central Bank independence globally
and maintains a successful inflation-targeting framework (Venter 2020). Moreover,
among the LA countries that have adopted floating regimes and inflation targets, Chile
has one of the lowest rates of intervention in the exchange market (Pérez Caldentey and
Vernengo 2020). In the international context, the foreign policy in Chile has also been
able to consolidate long-term coherence (Minke Contreras 2020). Therefore, from a
technical point of view, we think that Chile would be the most suitable core country for
a possible monetary union in SA because this country better fits the basic criteria of a
core player in the monetary integration process (macroeconomic stability, institutional
credibility and an appropriate international reputation). However, one limitation is the
low relevance of Chile in the regional economy (barely 7% of SA’s total GDP). Finally,
although Chile has not risked its economic sovereignty in regional integration schemes
(Fermandois 2011), in recent years Chile has shown greater regional commitment with
the auspices of the Union of South American Nations (UNASUR of 2008) and the
launching of regional institutions (Pacific Alliance, PA of 2012; PROSUR of 2019)
(Wehner 2020).
Note: Intra-regional trade to EMU-12 is calculated as a fraction of the average
exports to EMU-12 from 2001 to 2015 divided by the total average exports within the
same period. The decomposition of the variance is taken from the BM model.
Note: Intra-regional trade to SA is calculated as a fraction of the average exports to
SA from 2001 to 2015 divided by the total average exports within the same period. The
decomposition of the variance is taken from the BM model.
Note: Intra-regional trade to SA is calculated as a fraction of the average exports to
SA from 2001 to 2015 divided by the total average exports within the same period. The
decomposition of the variance is taken from the M1 model.
Note: Intra-regional trade to SA is calculated as a fraction of the average exports to
SA from 2001 to 2015 divided by the total average exports within the same period. The
decomposition of the variance is taken from the M5 model.
6 Conclusions
The main findings in this paper are that we find EMU-12 countries’ regional shocks
have been similar before and after adoption of the euro (with the exception of Ireland
and Greece, which have experienced a largely diminished influence of regional shocks
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in their economic fluctuations). Furthermore, the countries in which the benefits of
adopting a common currency (measured as intra-regional trade) are greater than the
costs (measured as the influence of regional shocks) are Italy, Belgium, Austria,
the Netherlands and Luxembourg. A parallel analysis for SA countries reveals
that economic disturbances are dominated by country-specific shocks and these
have not changed greatly compared to the period of macroeconomic instability
in the region (between 1970 and 2000). In other words, the costs of adopting a
common currency would be higher for the SA economies than the EMU-12
countries. Nevertheless, although changes in the model specifications produce
slightly differences outcomes —especially when Brazil is integrated to represent
the regional output— the most important result of this research is the identifi-
cation of a group of countries named Sud-5 (comprised of Chile, Peru, Ecuador,
Brazil and Argentina), for which the costs of a hypothetical monetary union
would be relatively lower. Furthermore, taking into account that monetary
unions increase trade between their members, a common currency in Sud-5
would booster intra-regional trade in countries that share borders, effectively
increasing the efficiency gains of forming a union. The majority of these
countries belong to CAN: Peru and Ecuador are current members, and Chile,
Argentina and Brazil are associate members. These results are similar to those
of Hafner and Kampe (2018), who determined that CAN countries are in a
better position to form a monetary area compared to MERCOSUR countries.
Therefore, Sud-5 could be considered the most appropriate core for the creation
of a single currency in SA, even though SA as a whole cannot be considered
as an optimal monetary area.
A feasible path for SA countries would be a partial monetary integration in which
the economies that have the best conditions to adopt a common currency form a core
and then other economies that meet the basic requirements can gradually integrate.
Certainly, the euro area showed that the creation of a monetary area can be a long and
complex process (which includes trade liberalization, market integration, the creation of
institutional and legal structures, and a long period of policy harmonization); however,
the inclusion of new members is feasible. Nonetheless, the European experience has
also shown that in order to establish a solid monetary union, it is imperative that
members meet the technical criteria to avoid internal imbalances.
Finally, there are two possible economies in SA that could play a central (or
core) role in monetary integration: Brazil and Chile. On the one hand, Brazil is the
region’s most representative economy (approximately 50% of SA’s total GDP)
and maintains a great influence on Chile’s business cycle. On the other hand,
Chile’s economy shows macroeconomic stability, institutional credibility and an
appropriate international reputation. From a technical point of view, we think that
Chile would be the most suitable core country for a possible monetary union in
SA because this country better fits the basic criteria to be the core member of a
monetary integration process. However, despite Sud-5 countries facing lower costs
of adopting a common currency, it is unlikely that they will form a monetary
union in the short to medium term given the low level of regional integration and
the tendency to resist loss of sovereignty in SA.
Acknowledgments No apply.
326 L. Padilla, Á. R. García-Brazales
Open Access This article is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License, which
permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give
appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence, and
indicate if changes were made. The images or other third party material in this article are included in the
article's Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line to the material. If material is not
included in the article's Creative Commons licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory
regulation or exceeds the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder.
To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/.
References
Alesina A, Barro R, Tenreyro S (2002) Optimal currency areas. Natl Bur Econ Res Work Pap Ser No. 9072.
https://doi.org/10.3386/w9072
Aminian N, Fung KC, Ng F (2009) A comparative analysis of trade and economic integration in East Asia and
Latin America. Econ Chang Restruct 42:105–137. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10644-008-9059-z
Basnet HC, Pradhan G (2017) Regional economic integration in Mercosur: the role of real and financial
sectors. Rev Dev Financ 7:107–119. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.rdf.2017.05.001
Basnet HC, Sharma SC (2013) Economic integration in Latin America. J econ Integr 28:551–579. https://doi.
org/10.11130/jei.2013.28.4.551
Bayoumi T, Eichengreen B (1993) One money or many? On analyzing the prospects for monetary unification
in various parts of the world. Univ Calif Berkeley. Cent Int Dev Econ Res Work Pap. https://doi.org/10.
22004/ag.econ.233213
Berger H, Nitsch V (2008) Zooming out: the trade effect of the euro in historical perspective. J Int Money
Financ 27:1244–1260. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jimonfin.2008.07.005
Blanchard OJ, Quah D (1988) The dynamic effects of aggregate demand and supply disturbances. Natl Bur
Econ Res Work Pap Ser No. 2737. https://doi.org/10.3386/w2737
Bresser-Pereira LC, Holland M (2009) Common currency and economic integration in Mercosul. J Post
Keynes Econ 32:213–234. https://doi.org/10.2753/PKE0160-3477320206
Bun MJG, Klaassen FJGM (2007) The euro effect on trade is not as large as commonly thought. Oxf Bull
Econ Stat 69:473–496. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.2007.00448.x
Chow HK, Kim Y (2003) A common currency peg in East Asia? Perspectives from Western Europe. J
Macroecon 25:331–350. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0164-0704(03)00041-7
Coelho DR (2020) Brazil’s economic reform roads. Bus Econ 55:80–91. https://doi.org/10.1057/s11369-020-
00162-8
Crum B (2013) Saving the euro at the cost of democracy? J Common Mark Stud 51:614–630. https://doi.org/
10.1111/jcms.12019
De Grauwe P (2016) Economics of monetary union, 11th edit. Oxford University Press.
De Grauwe P, Ji Y (2015) Has the Eurozone become less fragile? Some empirical tests. J Policy Model 37:
404–414. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2015.03.003
De Grauwe P, Mongelli F (2005) Endogeneities of optimum currency areas: what brings countries sharing a
single currency closer together? European Central Bank, Working Paper, No. 468.
de Nardis S, Vicarelli C (2003) Currency unions and trade: the special case of EMU. Rev World Econ 139:
625–649. https://doi.org/10.1007/BF02653107
Dorrucci E, Firpo S, Fratzscher M, Mongelli FP (2004) The link between institutional and economic
integration: insights for Latin America from the European experience. Open Econ Rev 15:239–260.
https://doi.org/10.1023/B:OPEN.0000037699.34047.be
Dutta T, Rawat A, Mishra A (2020) Latin America: Problems and Opportunities of Integration. pp. 241–255.
https://doi.org/10.4018/978-1-7998-1730-7.ch013
Edwards S (2006) Monetary unions, external shocks and economic performance: a Latin American perspec-
tive. Int Econ Econ Policy 3:225–247. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10368-006-0056-2
Eichengreen B (1998) Does Mercosur need a single currency? Natl Bur Econ Res Work pap Ser no. 6821.
https://doi.org/10.3386/w6821
Eichengreen B (2012) European monetary integration with benefit of hindsight. J Common Mark Stud 50:
123–136. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2011.02231.x
Can South America form an optimal monetary area? A structural... 327
Fermandois J (2011) Pragmatism, ideology, and tradition in Chilean foreign policy since 1990 BT - Latin
American foreign policies: between ideology and pragmatism. In: Gardini GL, Lambert P (eds) . Palgrave
Macmillan US, New York, pp 35–52
Frankel JA (1999) No single currency regime is right for all countries or at all times. Natl Bur Econ Res Work
Pap Ser No 7338. https://doi.org/10.3386/w7338
Frankel JA, Rose AK (1997) Is EMUmore justifiable ex post than ex ante? Eur Econ Rev 41:753–760. https://
doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(97)00034-2
Frankel JA, Rose AK (2001) The Endogenity of the optimum currency area criteria. Econ J 108:1009–1025.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0297.00327
Hadjimichalis C (2011) Uneven geographical development and socio-spatial justice and solidarity: European
regions after the 2009 financial crisis. Eur Urban Reg Stud 18:254–274. https://doi.org/10.1177/
0969776411404873
Hafner KA, Kampe L (2018) Monetary union in Latin America: an assessment in the context of optimum
currency area. Appl Econ 50:5672–5697. https://doi.org/10.1080/00036846.2018.1489116
Hochreiter E, Siklos PL (2002) Alternative exchange-rate regimes: the options for Latin America. North Am J
Econ Financ 13:195–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1062-9408(02)00099-2
Hochreiter E, Schmidt-Hebbel K, Winckler G (2002) Monetary union: European lessons, Latin American
prospects. North Am J Econ Financ 13:297–321. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1062-9408(02)00097-9
Kenen P (1969) The theory of optimum currency areas: an eclectic view. In: Mundell R, Swoboda A (eds)
monetary problems of the international economy. University of Chicago Press, Chicago, pp 41–60
King R, Plosser C, Stock J, Watson M (1987) Stochastic trends and economic fluctuations. Am Econ Rev.
https://doi.org/10.3386/w2229
Kopits G (2002) Central European EU accession and Latin American integration: mutual lessons in macro-
economic policy design. North Am J Econ Financ 13:253–277. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1062-9408(02)
00092-X
Larrain F, Tavares J (2003) Regional currencies versus dollarization: options for Asia and the Americas. J
Policy Reform 6:35–49. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.398061
Licandro G (2000) Is Mercosur an optimal currency area ? A shock correlation perspective A shock correlation
perspective, Montevideo
Márquez-Ramos L, Florensa LM, Recalde ML (2017) Understanding the determinants of economic integra-
tion in Latin America. J econ Integr 32:558–585. https://doi.org/10.11130/jei.2017.32.3.558
McKinnon RI (1963) Optimum currency areas. Am Econ Rev 53:717–725
Minke Contreras J (2020) Towards development-oriented foreign policy in Latin America: the cases of
Ecuador and Chile. Bull Lat Am Res. https://doi.org/10.1111/blar.13110
Mongelli F (2002) New views on the optimum currency area theory: what is EMU telling us? European
Central Bank, Working Paper, No. 138.
Mundell RA (1961) A theory of optimum currency areas. Am Econ Rev Econ Rev 51:657–665
Numa M (2011) The feasibility of a monetary union in MERCOSUR. Michigan J Bus 4:11–59
Obstfeld M, Rogoff K (1996) Foundations of international macroeconomics. MIT Press, Cambridge
Pérez Caldentey E, Vernengo M (2020) The historical evolution of monetary policy in Latin America. In:
Battilossi S, Cassis Y, Yago K (eds) Handbook of the history of money and currency. Springer Singapore,
Singapore, pp 953–980
Regmi K, Nikolsko-Rzhevskyy A, Thornton R (2015) To be or not to be: an optimum currency area for South
Asia? J Policy Model 37:930–944. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2015.09.005
Reyes J, Schiavo S, Fagiolo G (2010) Using complex networks analysis to assess the evolution of international
economic integration: the cases of East Asia and Latin America. J Int Trade Econ Dev 19:215–239.
https://doi.org/10.1080/09638190802521278
Rivarola Puntigliano A, Briceño Ruiz J (2017) Brazil and Latin America: between the separation and
integration paths. Lanham: Lexington Books.
Rose AK (2000) One money, one market: the effect of common currencies on trade. Econ Policy 15:8–45.
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-0327.00056
328 L. Padilla, Á. R. García-Brazales
Scholvin S, Malamud A (2020) Is Brazil a Geoeconomic node? Geography, public policy, and the failure of
economic integration in South America. Brazilian Polit Sci Rev 14(2), e0004. https://doi.org/10.1590/
1981-3821202000020004
Venter Z (2020) The interaction between conventional monetary policy and financial stability: Chile,
Colombia, Japan, Portugal and the UK. Comp Econ Stud 62:521–554. https://doi.org/10.1057/s41294-
020-00129-w
Visser H (2004) A guide to international monetary Economics. Exchange rate theories, systems and policies.,
third edit. Edward Elgar publishing.
Wehner LE (2020) Chile’s soft misplaced regional identity. Cambridge Rev Int Aff 33:555–571. https://doi.
org/10.1080/09557571.2020.1752148
Zhao X, Kim Y (2009) Is the CFA franc zone an optimum currency area? World Dev 37:1877–1886. https://
doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2009.03.011
Publisher’s note Springer Nature remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Affiliations
León Padilla1 & Ángel Rodriguez García-Brazales2
Ángel Rodriguez García-Brazales
angel.rodriguez@uam.es
1 Economics and Business Research Center (CIEE), Faculty of Economics & Business, Universidad de las
Américas, St. de los Granados E12-41y Colimes, EC170125 Quito, Ecuador
2 Department of Economic Analysis: Economic Theory and Economic History, Faculty of Economics &
Business, Universidad Autonoma de Madrid, Ciudad Universitaria de Cantoblanco, 28049 Madrid, Spain
Can South America form an optimal monetary area? A structural... 329
